[lustre-devel] sec: O_DIRECT for encrypted file crashes Linux client
Sebastien Buisson
sbuisson at ddn.com
Sun Oct 18 23:01:51 PDT 2020
> Le 19 oct. 2020 à 02:47, NeilBrown <neilb at suse.de> a écrit :
>
> On Mon, Oct 19 2020, James Simmons wrote:
>
>> I have ported patch https://review.whamcloud.com/38967 which is
>> "lustre: sec: O_DIRECT for encrypted file". The big difference is that for
>> the Linux client we are using the native fscrypto layer. In my testing I'm
>> seeing:
>>
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:49 [ 4462.081809][T14012] Lustre: DEBUG MARKER: == sanity
>> test 56w: check lfs_migrate -c stripe_count works
>> ========================================== 15:26:49 (1603049209)
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.514691][T30281] BUG: kernel NULL pointer
>> dereference, address: 0000000000000048
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.524282][T30281] #PF: supervisor read access in
>> kernel mode
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.532011][T30281] #PF: error_code(0x0000) -
>> not-present page
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.539709][T30281] PGD 80000007edcce067 P4D
>> 80000007edcce067 PUD 7f1306067 PMD 0
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.549144][T30281] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.555851][T30281] CPU: 0 PID: 30281 Comm:
>> ptlrpcd_00_04 Tainted: G W 5.7.0-rc7+ #1
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.566720][T30281] Hardware name: Supermicro Super
>> Server/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS 2.0b 08/12/2016
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.577932][T30281] RIP:
>> 0010:mempool_free+0x12/0x80
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.584690][T30281] Code: 60 e8 ff cc cc cc cc cc
>> 0f 1f 44 00 00 e9 86 a3 08 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 85 ff
>> 48 89 fd 53 74 1a 48 89 f3 <8b> 46 48 39 46 4c 7c 12 48 8b 73 58 48 8b 43
>> 68 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.607734][T30281] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002414fcc0
>> EFLAGS: 00010282
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.615423][T30281] RAX: ffff8887d44fb5e0 RBX:
>> 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.625013][T30281] RDX: ffff888845abb780 RSI:
>> 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffea001f553340
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.634577][T30281] RBP: ffffea001f553340 R08:
>> 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.644109][T30281] R10: 0000000000000000 R11:
>> 000000000000000f R12: 0000000000000000
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.653614][T30281] R13: ffff8887d736c9f0 R14:
>> 0000000000000010 R15: ffff888845abb780
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.663095][T30281] FS: 0000000000000000(0000)
>> GS:ffff88885e600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.673521][T30281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000
>> CR0: 0000000080050033
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.681579][T30281] CR2: 0000000000000048 CR3:
>> 00000007cf9fa004 CR4: 00000000001606f0
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.691015][T30281] Call Trace:
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.695751][T30281] brw_interpret+0xac/0xa60 [osc]
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.702190][T30281] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.708490][T30281] ptlrpc_check_set+0x329/0x1790
>> [ptlrpc]
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.715599][T30281] ptlrpcd_check+0x411/0x460
>> [ptlrpc]
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.722318][T30281] ptlrpcd+0x278/0x300 [ptlrpc]
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.728463][T30281] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.734667][T30281] kthread+0x12a/0x170
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.739993][T30281] ? ptlrpcd_check+0x460/0x460
>> [ptlrpc]
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.746745][T30281] ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
>> 2020-10-18 15:26:52 [ 4464.752431][T30281] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
>>
>> Neil I suspect you might see this as well once this patch is ported to
>> your tree. Any idea why this would break? I haven't dugged down into it
>> yet.
>
> Something has passed a NULL mempool to mempool_free().
> Possibly osc_release_bounce_pages -> fscrypt_finalize_bounce_page
> -> fscrypt_free_bounce_page -> mempool_free
I agree this might be the call path leading to the stack above.
> The pool is initialized by fscrypt_initialize <-
> fscrypt_get_encryption_info.
> I don't know why that hasn't been called.
In fact, James hit this bug while running sanity test_56w. So I doubt it is using encryption.
I think the question is more « why is this page considered a bounce page? ».
Sebastien.
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